Truth
Description
Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.
Reviews
". . . well-informed, giving a judicious view of a great deal of the recent work on truth. Engel keeps the reader's interest throughout, the discussions are clear and helpful, and students both at introductory and at quite advanced levels will be very grateful for it." Simon Blackburn, University of Cambridge "The book exhibits a remarkable breadth of philosophical spectrum and intellectual richness - which is rarely seen in books of similar character. It is refreshing to come across a work on contemporary theories of propositional truth that situates the discussion within a well-informed but non-digressive historical framework. Engel convincingly gestures towards a viable synthesis that avoids the metaphysical extravagancies of the traditional substantive theories of truth while reaffirming its verification-transcendent status." Murat Bac, Philosophy, Dalhousie University